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Mills: Kurt Mills on The Dark Sides of Virtue

The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism by David Kennedy. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2005. 400 pp.

In The Dark Sides of Virtue, David Kennedy attempts to reflect upon and problematize what he
calls international humanitarianism. By humanitarianism, he does not mean international
humanitarian law or the provision of humanitarian assistance (e.g., food, shelter, medicine) in the
midst of conflict, though the practice of each of these activities would fall within his definition of
the term. Rather, he means something much broader: the general practice of human rights. The
closest we get to a definition of humanitarianism is on page 236: “to refer very generally to
people who aspire to make the world more just, to the projects they have launched over the past
century in pursuit of that goal, and to the professional vocabularies which have sprung up to
defend and elaborate these projects.” In other words, his goal is to look at how the “do-gooders”
attempt to “do good.”
The books starts with a not- so- short list of what he calls “pragmatic worries:”— “human rights
promises more than it can deliver;” “human rights generalizes too much;” “human rights
particularizes too much;” or “human rights views the problem and the solution too narrowly.”
Each of these “worries” is broken down into a number of what might be called “sub-worries:”—
“strengthening the state;” “encouraging conflict and discouraging politics among rights holders;”
or “‘refugees’ are people too.” He raises valid points and concerns, although the reader is left
wishing for much more elaboration on each point (8, 10, 13, 15-17).
After raising the question, “human rights: part of the problem?” the author launches into a
vignette in which he describes a human rights mission to Uruguay to interview political
prisoners, which provides insights into the reality of such human rights work “on the ground.”
This description is interspersed with reflections on his role as a human rights lawyer
interviewing, and supposedly speaking for, those who have had their human rights violated in a
foreign country. Kennedy’s description raises questions that include: Can he really represent
people who he has met for perhaps an hour? Can he also represent global norms and opinions to
elites, who hold the power? Does international law have enough authority in this context? Is he
actually doing good for these victims of human rights abuse, or is he himself getting more out of
the interaction—adventure, professional satisfaction, self-approbation?
In this discussion, similar to other issues he addresses, such as dealing with refugees and the laws
of war, the author investigates the professionalism of “do-goodism,” dissecting the terminology
used, the ways of interacting with each other and the adversary (i.e., human rights abusing
governments or the military) and asking whether the professionalization of human rights work
has divorced it from broader realities. He also questions whether the particular human rights
constructs used might actually make problems worse by giving governments greater latitude—
particularly in the realm of international humanitarian law—or by divorcing human rights work
from politics. He seems to castigate “do-gooders” for not wanting to dirty their hands in the
muddy waters of politics. In this articulation he is calling for a much more pragmatic approach to
conceptualizing and addressing human rights issues than many “do-gooders” might be
comfortable with—but he also wants them to realize that such pragmatism may be little more
than a realism that undermines their ultimate goals. And this is where the value of this book
lies—challenging those who engage in human rights work to open their eyes to the real world,
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engage in the political process, and reflect much more deeply upon how they go about their work
and the possible consequences of their work— both good and bad.
There is no theory here, and in a sense this is a good thing, because it allows Kennedy to
investigate the “do-gooder” milieu without trying to shoehorn their actions into particular
theoretical constructs and agendas, which frequently have little to do with an on the ground
reality. This lack of theory is also, in a sense, one of its greatest drawbacks because it makes it
difficult for the reader—whether they are “do-gooders” themselves, policymakers, or others—to
draw any lasting conclusions about how to “do good.” Yet the challenges it poses should be
taken seriously—particularly, perhaps, by bright, enthusiastic undergraduates who want to
change the world but have no idea what that might actually entail.
Dr. Kurt Mills, Senior Lecturer in International Human Rights
University of Glasgow
September 2006
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